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I. INTRODUCTION
I doubt that the Anglo-Irish statesman and political theorist Edmund
Burke devoted a great deal of attention to patent law.1 To be sure, patents
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1. The only evidence I have seen thus far of Burke's thoughts on patents is a cita-
tion to an unpublished manuscript of Burke's that is said to be in the National Library of
Ireland. See David L. Cohen, Article 69 and European Patent Integration, 92 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1082, 1095 n.63 (1998) (citing KEITH DUTTON, EDMUND BURKE 23 (1979) (quoting
Edmund Burke for the proposition that "[m]onopoly is an odious term ... [but patent] is
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for new inventions were part of the legal environment during Burke's life-
time (1729-1797), both within the United Kingdom and in several other
countries, including (from 1790 on) the United States.2 But Burke had
many other matters to occupy his attention, among them the American co-
lonists' revolt (Burke favored a conciliatory approach), Catholic emanci-
pation (which Burke also favored), and the mismanagement of the East
India Company (the governor of which Burke unsuccessfully prosecuted
for corruption). Burke is probably best remembered today, however, for
his passionate defense of traditional conservatism, most prominently in his
famous work Reflections on the Revolution in France.3
Written following the deposition of Louis XVI and the establishment
of the French Republic, but before Louis's execution and the Reign of
Terror, Reflections casts the revolution in a sinister light, arguing that the
radical changes convulsing France at the time were likely to bring consid-
erable misery in their wake. In making his case against the revolution,
Burke presents an eloquent defense of tradition and custom that has at-
tracted many adherents to the present day. In what is probably the most
oft-quoted passage from the book, Burke expresses fear over "put[ting]
men to live and trade each on his own private stock of reason; because we
suspect that this stock in each man is small, and that the individuals would
do better to avail themselves of the general bank and capital of nations and
not making a monopoly of what was common. It is the direct reverse, for the condition of
the patent, compelling a discovery, makes that common which was private before")); cf.
Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 291 (1988)
(speculating that Burke would have objected to the "egalitarian" nature of intellectual
property, which empowers "the talented upstarts Burke sought to restrain").
2. As explained by historian Christine MacLeod, however, to refer to English prac-
tice during Burke's day as a patent "system" may be "something of a misnomer." CHRIS-
TINE MACLEOD, INVENTING THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION: THE ENGLISH PATENT SYS-
TEM, 1660-1800 1 (1988). Although "[p]atents for invention have been granted regularly
since the middle of the sixteenth century ... it was not until 1852 that the first major leg-
islation on patents was enacted by parliament and the Patent Office established." Id. Prior
to that time, the inventor had to endure a circuitous ten-stage procedure involving several
different government offices. See id. at 40-41. For discussion of the early U.S. patent
system, see EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, To PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS:
AMERICAN PATENT LAW AND ADMINISTRATION 1798-1836 (1998).
3. See EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE (Frank M.
Turner ed., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1790). Burke actually was a member of the Whig
Party, not the Tories, and at least some of his modem day admirers depict him as some-
thing of a moderate liberal within the context of his time and place. See CONOR CRUISE
O'BRIEN, THE GREAT MELODY: A THEMATIC BIOGRAPHY AND COMMENTED ANTHOLOGY
OF EDMUND BURKE xxxii-xli, lxi-lxiv (1992); Carl Bogus, Rescuing Burke, 72 Mo. L.
REv. (forthcoming 2007) (distinguishing Burke from modem-day religious conservatives,
neoconservatives, and libertarians).
[Vol. 22:855
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of ages."4 In other words, for Burke, tradition and custom embody prac-
tices that incorporate the collective insights of many people and that have
proven successful over time; they are therefore likely to reflect more wis-
dom and foresight than any one individual is likely to possess. Indeed,
much of the value of tradition and custom may not even be apparent to any
single individual or subgroup. The many are indeed smarter than the few.
Burkean conservatism nevertheless labors under some obvious limita-
tions. More than a few traditional practices, such as slavery or torture,
surely strike most of us as downright repellent. 5 Moreover, the extent to
which tradition reflects the perspectives of elites clearly presents a bone of
contention for thinkers more inclined towards egalitarianism. On a more
practical level, one might question whether tradition can respond ade-
quately to emergencies or to novel, long-term challenges such as environ-
mental degradation. But Burke himself recognized that change is some-
times necessary to respond to changing circumstances, and that mindless
conformity to tradition is no virtue. As Burke put it, "A state without the
means of some change is without the means of its conservation.",6 Burkean
conservatives nevertheless clearly prefer gradual, incremental change to
radical change, anticipating that radical change can give rise to unforesee-
able negative consequences and erode the unappreciated benefits embod-
ied in tradition. For Burkeans, changes to laws and social practices
should be based whenever possible on experience, as opposed to abstract
ideas, and should be proportionate to the perceived change in circum-
stances.8
4. BURKE, supra note 3, at 74.
5. See ROGER SCRUTON, THE MEANING OF CONSERVATISM 34 (1999) (stating that
the traditions which conservatives uphold, unlike torture, "engage the loyalty of their
participants, in the deep sense of moulding their idea of what they are and should be");
Cass Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353, 371 (2006) (arguing that
Burkeanism fails when custom is based on collective action or other problems, and thus
fails to reflect latent wisdom). Burke himself was opposed to slavery. See O'BRIEN, supra
note 3, at 91-92; Bogus, supra note 3.
6. BURKE, supra note 3, at 19.
7. See id. at 51-52, 133, 143.
8. There are, to be sure, many (sometimes conflicting) interpretations of Burkean
conservatism. Some self-professed Burkeans, such as Russell Kirk and Roger Scruton,
emphasize tradition's role in affirming the meaning of individual lives within the context
of civil and religious society. See RUSSELL KIRK, THE CONSERVATIVE MIND: FROM
BURKE TO ELIOT 28-47 (7th ed. 1986); SCRUTON, supra note 5, at 8, 30-36, 157-63. By
contrast, Friedrich Hayek admired Burke's appreciation of tradition as an aggregator of
individual wisdom, and identified Burke as a classical "liberal" in the sense of a defender
of free markets and limited government. See F.A. Hayek, Why I Am Not a Conservative,
in THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 397, 407-08 (1960); see also F.A. HAYEK, THE FATAL
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It would be strange, no doubt, to argue that Burke's views on such
specific and weighty matters as the French Revolution, the British Consti-
tution, or the relationship of church to state have any direct bearing on, of
all things, patent law. What I will argue in this Article, however, is that
some of the general themes found in Burke's writing-his preference for
gradual, incremental, organic social change, as opposed to top-down,
grandly theoretical social engineering, as well as his concomitant appre-
ciation for the unarticulated wisdom that is sometimes embodied in tradi-
tion-may shed some light on some contemporary debates about the scope
of patentable subject matter. To be sure, the content of these contemporary
debates may pale in comparison with the political and social upheavals
that motivated Burke to record his thoughts for posterity. But the scope of
patent law is hardly a trivial matter either, and a well-functioning patent
system can play a crucial role in either fostering or impeding the innova-
tion upon which human survival may depend. I will argue that a Burkean-
inspired approach to patent law-one that respects, though it does not
worship, tradition and that generally prefers gradual to radical change-
suggests that we consider again some traditional, but now dormant, re-
straints on patentable subject matter that may have embodied a degree of
wisdom. More specifically, I argue that some of the traditional limitations
on patentable subject matter, as embodied in the technological arts, mental
steps, and physical transformation doctrines, may yet have much to rec-
ommend them. Reintroduction of these requirements, suitably reformed to
CONCEIT: THE ERRORS OF SOCIALIsM 7 (1988) (arguing that free markets aggregate in-
formation concerning consumer demand much more efficiently than any central planner
ever could). Michael Oakeshott, on the other hand, found affinity in Burke's admiration
of custom as embodying practical wisdom that cannot be reduced to mere technique, and
dismissed Hayek's rationalist politics as the mirror image of the trend it sought to coun-
ter. See MICHAEL OAKESHOTT, RATIONALISM IN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 26 (Lib-
erty Press 1991). To the extent my discussion above emphasizes tradition as the embodi-
ment of unappreciated wisdom, it may have more in common with the Hayek and Oake-
shott interpretations than with those of Kirk and Scruton.
There are also different ways that Burkeans might define and use tradition. As
Sunstein notes, with particular emphasis on the application of Burkeanism to constitu-
tional adjudication, some Burkeans might stress adherence to social practices while oth-
ers might emphasize adherence to judicial precedent (and Burke himself tended to con-
flate the two); some might look to tradition at a high level of abstraction while others
might focus more narrowly on the content of specific traditions. See Sunstein, supra note
5, at 368. For present purposes, my modest claim is simply that certain patent law doc-
trines such as technological arts, mental steps, and physical transformation, embodied a
tradition loosely understood as a general or common understanding of the limited scope
of patentable subject matter; and that that general or common understanding, whatever its
flaws may have been, may also have embodied a degree of wisdom that is too easily
shunted aside in the quest for an all-encompassing approach to patentable subject matter.
[Vol. 22:855
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reflect changing times, into U.S. law would permit the patenting of soft-
ware-related inventions and business methods, as is arguably required un-
der the TRIPs Agreement.9 But, it might go a long way toward screening
out patents that read on laws of nature or that threaten to interfere with
important liberty interests.
Part II of this Article presents an overview of patent eligibility and dis-
cusses the courts' and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office's (USPTO)
retreat from the technological arts, mental steps, and physical transforma-
tion doctrines. Part III argues that these traditional limitations may have
embodied some underappreciated wisdom. Part IV suggests some possible
ways in which these doctrines might be revived and reformed to be of use
today. Part V concludes.
II. PATENT ELIGIBILITY
The current version of the Patent Act explicitly refers to four broad
categories of patentable subject matter, namely processes, machines, arti-
cles of manufacture, and compositions of matter. 10 Earlier versions,
though worded slightly differently, "l were interpreted for the most part to
include these same four categories, although until the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury it was unclear whether processes were patentable to the extent they
read on embodiments not disclosed within the patent description." No
version of the Act, however, has ever defined these terms or stated what
types of inventions or discoveries fall outside the scope of statutory sub-
ject matter. 3 Courts and commentators nevertheless have traditionally
agreed upon three general categories of nonpatentable subject matter,
9. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC,
Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [herein-
after TRIPs Agreement].
10. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
11. See, e.g., Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 24, 16 Stat. 198, 201 ("[A]ny person
who has invented or discovered any new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or com-
position of matter ... may ... obtain a patent therefor."); Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 1,
1 Stat. 318, 319 (stating the same language as the Patent Act of 1870).
12. See, e.g., 1 R. CARL MOY, MOY'S WALKER ON PATENTS §§ 5.21-.22 (4th ed.
2006) (discussing doctrinal developments).
13. Case law has sometimes provided definitions of the terms "machine," "composi-
tion of matter," "manufacture," and "process." See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175,
182-84 (1981) (discussing processes); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308
(1980) (discussing articles of manufacture and compositions of matter). For present pur-
poses, not much hangs on the distinctions among machines, compositions of matter, and
manufactures. As for processes, see infra note 39 and accompanying text.
2007]
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namely laws of nature, abstract ideas, and naturally-occurring physical
phenomena. 14 These three exclusions from the scope of patentable subject
matter persist, but several other doctrines that courts once employed to
exclude yet other inventions from patent eligibility have in recent years
been narrowed or jettisoned altogether. Prominent among these other ex-
clusions have been the mental steps doctrine, the technological arts doc-
trine, and (though it is not the principal focus of this Article) the exclusion
of business methods, though there have been others. 15
The basic intuition behind the mental steps doctrine-that patent
claims should not "read on" (cover) activity that takes place within the
human mind-appears to underlie several decisions dating back to the ear-
ly twentieth century. 16 But the doctrine has always been somewhat am-
14. See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185; Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309. Some critics have
argued, however, that the U.S. Supreme Court has never squarely held that laws of nature
are not patentable, and that cases that assert, or have been cited as having asserted, this
principle do so only in dicta. See, e.g., Brief for Franklin Pierce Law Center as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Respondents at 6-11, Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs.,
Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921 (2006) (No. 04-607), 2006 WL 304561. It is nevertheless fair to
state that the vast majority of observers, including the Patent Office itself, have long in-
terpreted laws of nature, abstract ideas, and naturally-occurring physical phenomena as
unpatentable. Products of nature that have been isolated and refined from their naturally-
occurring state, however, have been viewed as patentable at least since Parke-Davis &
Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on
other grounds, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912). The Supreme Court established the patentabil-
ity of human-created bacterium in Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310. Although critics of
Chakrabarty contend, with some force, that this interpretation of the Patent Act departed
from the traditional understanding of the scope of patentable subject matter, my principal
focus in this Article is on departures involving inventions other than life forms.
15. For example, beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, the USPTO and the
courts began rejecting applications claiming purportedly novel types of business forms
under the "printed matter" doctrine. By most accounts, the doctrine was intended to pre-
serve the boundary between patent and copyright law. See, e.g., MoY, supra note 12,
§§ 5.10-5.11. As the doctrine exists today, it renders unpatentable an invention that is
distinct from the prior art only by virtue of printed matter that is not "functionally related
to the underlying object." See In re Ngai, 367 F.3d 1336, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Con-
strued more broadly, the printed matter doctrine might pose a serious threat to the pat-
entability of many software-related inventions, but few observers, even among those
most critical of software patents, argue for revival of a strengthened printed matter doc-
trine.
16. See Don Lee, Inc. v. Walker, 61 F.2d 58, 67 (9th Cir. 1932) (rejecting a claim
directed toward a method of computation); Ex parte Meinhardt, 1907 Comm'n Dec. 238,
239 (stating that methods for solving mathematical problems are unpatentable); Warren
T. Jessup, Patentability of Mental Processes, 40 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 482, 482 (1958) (de-
scribing the doctrine as having evolved during the preceding fifty years, though in the
author's opinion on the basis of a misreading of case law as requiring that processes ef-
fect physical transformations); Norman D. McClaskey, The Mental Process Doctrine: Its
[Vol. 22:855
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biguous in its interpretation. A very broad interpretation of the doctrine
would render unpatentable a process that contains any steps that can be
performed mentally, regardless of whether (1) the process also contains
steps that are incapable of being performed mentally, or (2) the steps that
can be performed mentally also can be performed non-mentally. It does
not appear that any courts or commentators have ever interpreted the doc-
trine quite this expansively, although some appear to have taken the posi-
tion that subject matter is unpatentable if the novelty or nonobviousness of
the invention is attributable entirely to the mental step or steps (the so-
called "point of novelty" test). 17 Some observers also expressed the view
that a process that can be performed entirely by mental steps is unpat-
entable, even if the process also can be performed by means of a machine
or apparatus. 18 The narrowest interpretation of the doctrine would limit
patent exclusion to processes that are incapable of being performed by a
machine or apparatus-that is, to processes which, if they are to be per-
formed at all, must be performed exclusively by mental steps. 1
9
Origin, Legal Bases, and Scope, 55 IOWA L. REV. 1148 (1970) (similar); Katharine P.
Ambrose, Comment, The Mental Steps Doctrine, 48 TENN. L. REV. 903, 903 (1981) (re-
ferring to the doctrine as "the product of some unclear thinking in the 1940s"). Interest-
ingly, though, Ambrose concludes her critical analysis of the mental steps doctrine by
proposing that a process would lack novelty if it attempted "to remove from the public
domain any abstract idea, law of nature, or physical phenomenon that is presumed to
have always existed." Id. at 917. This is not very different from Professor Collins' pro-
posal, discussed infra notes 186-191 and accompanying text, that the mental steps doc-
trine be revived to preclude patenting of claims which depart from the prior art only by
virtue of their inclusion of a mental step, on the ground that such claims do remove sub-
ject matter from the public domain.
17. See In re Abrams, 188 F.2d 165, 169 (C.C.P.A. 1951); In re Heritage, 150 F.2d
554, 556-57 (C.C.P.A. 1945); see also 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS
§ 1.03[6] (2006) (describing the "basic idea" of the mental steps doctrine as being "that
no patent can be obtained for a method an essential component of which consists of hu-
man mental participation").
18. See In re Mahony, 421 F.2d 742, 745 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (noting that "both sides
... have assumed that if a claim reads on both mental and non-mental implementation of
a process, the claim is drawn to non-statutory subject matter," but expressly declining to
decide whether that interpretation of the doctrine was correct); Moy, supra note 12,
§ 5.40 (stating that "[i]nventions claimed so narrowly as to cover only implementation by
machine are exempt" from the mental steps doctrine).
19. To cite a completely hypothetical example, presumably a claim could be drafted
in such a way as to specify that some or all of its steps must be performed mentally by a
human being, such as a method for performing a mind-reading illusion. A claim that
permits too much individual discretion or variability in its performance, however-for
example, a claim that depends upon the exercise of subjective aesthetic judgment-
probably would fail for lack of definiteness, regardless of the existence or not of a mental
2007]
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In In re Musgrave, 20 the inventor sought to patent a method for more
accurately mapping subsurface formations in the earth's crust. Some of the
steps of the method involved correcting for errors attributable to the pres-
ence of topsoil and the distance from shotpoint to measuring stations.
21
The patent examiner had rejected the claims at issue on the ground that
they included steps that could be performed mentally, but the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals reversed.22 In so holding, the court rejected
the point of novelty test, reasoning that "novelty and advancement of an
art are irrelevant to a determination of whether the nature of a process is
such that it is encompassed by the meaning of 'process' in 35 U.S.C.
101.,,23 In addition, the court rejected all but the narrowest interpretation
of the mental steps doctrine 24 and called into doubt even this interpretation
by stating that "[a]ll that is necessary ... to make a sequence of opera-
tional steps a statutory process within 35 U.S.C. 101 is that it be in the
technological arts so as to be in consonance with the Constitutional pur-
pose to promote the progress of 'useful arts.",, 25 As predicted by the con-
curring judge in Musgrave, who accused the majority of a radical break
with precedent, 26 the mental steps doctrine has become largely a dead let-
ter ever since.
27
Yet, while the Musgrave court narrowed the mental steps doctrine to
near oblivion, it nevertheless referred, in the portion of the opinion quoted
above, to the necessity for a patentable process to "be in the technological
arts so as to be in consonance with the Constitutional purpose to promote
the progress of 'useful arts.' ' '28 But this "technological arts" doctrine too
steps doctrine. See Datamize, L.L.C. v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1350
(Fed. Cir. 2005); In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1402 n.22 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
20. 431 F.2d 882 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
21. See id. at 882-85.
22. See id. at 885-93.
23. Id. at 889; see also In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395, 1399 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (reject-
ing point of novelty).
24. See Musgrave, 431 F.2d at 893.
25. Id.
26. See id. at 893-94 (Baldwin, J., concurring). Judge Baldwin concluded, however,
that the claims at issue either read only on machine-implemented steps, or included steps
that were not "purely mental," and therefore they did not violate the mental steps doc-
trine. See id. at 895.
27. See Kevin Emerson Collins, Propertizing Thought 53 (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author).
28. Musgrave, 431 F.2d at 893. The author of the majority opinion in Musgrave,
Judge Giles Rich, was one of the drafters of the 1952 Patent Act. See A. Samuel Oddi,
Regeneration in American Patent Law: Statutory Subject Matter, 46 IDEA 491, 546
(2006). He was also the author of the majority opinions in Alappat and State Street Bank,
[Vol. 22:855
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has recently fallen by the wayside, as a consequence of the expansion of
patentable subject matter over the last twenty-five years-an expansion
that in large part has been driven by the evolving standards relating to the
patentability of computer-related art.
The first two times the U.S. Supreme Court took up the issue of the pa-
tentability of computer-related art, in Gottschalk v. Benson29 and Parker v.
Flook, 3 0 it appeared to take a relatively hardline position against the pat-
entability of these inventions. In both cases, the majority noted that one
can characterize computer programs as mathematical algorithms, and sug-
gested that such algorithms are akin to laws of nature and therefore non-
patentable. 31 Both cases also purported not to hold, however, that com-
puter-related art is per se unpatentable,32 and (whether wittingly or not)
suggested several ways in which future courts might limit their holdings.
For example, in Gottschalk the Court noted that the claims at issue "were
not limited to any particular art or technology, [or] to any particular appa-
discussed infra at text accompanying notes 44-69. It is notable therefore that, even for
Judge Rich, the scope of patentable subject matter was not necessarily coextensive with
merely the "useful, concrete, and tangible," unless the latter two opinions illustrate a
change in his views. For Judge Rich, patentable subject matter must pertain to the "use-
ful" or "technological" arts, in contrast with the "liberal arts" or "fine arts." See John R.
Thomas, The Post-Industrial Patent System, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & EN-
TER. L.J. 3, 9 n.35 (1999) (explaining that not every invention is patentable because
"[ilnvaluable though it may be to individuals, the public, and national defense, the inven-
tion of a more effective organization of the materials in, and the techniques of teaching a
course in physics, chemistry or Russian is not a patentable invention" and noting further
that "[a]lso outside that group is one of the greatest inventions of our times, the diaper
service" (quoting Giles S. Rich, Principles of Patentability, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 393,
393-94 (1960))).
29. 409 U.S. 63 (1972). Justice Douglas authored the opinion of the Court. There
were no dissents, but three justices (Stewart, Blackmun, and Powell) did not participate in
the case.
30. 437 U.S. 584 (1978). Justice Stevens authored the majority opinion. Justice
Stewart dissented, and was joined by Chief Justice Burger and by Justice Rehnquist. See
id. at 599 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (arguing that the process at issue did not "lose[ ] its
status of subject-matter patentability simply because one step in the process would not be
patentable subject matter if considered in isolation").
31. See id. at 589 (stating that "an algorithm, or mathematical formula, is like a law
of nature"); Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 65, 67-68 (describing the invention at issue as an
"algorithm," that is, "a [p]rocedure for solving a given type of mathematical problem,"
and likening algorithms to nonpatentable "phenomena of nature, ... mental processes,
and abstract intellectual concepts").
32. See Flook, 437 U.S. at 590 ("[A] process is not unpatentable simply because it
contains a law of nature or a mathematical algorithm."); Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 71 ("It is
said that the decision precludes a patent for any program servicing a computer. We do not
so hold.").
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ratus or machinery, or to any particular end use"; and that the claims "pur-
ported to cover any use of the claimed method," for converting binary-
coded decimal numerals into pure binary numbers, using a general pur-
pose digital-purpose computer. 33 As a result, "the patent would wholly
pre-empt the mathematical formula and in practical effect would be a pat-
ent on the algorithm itself."3 4 Similarly, in Flook the Court stated that "a
process is not unpatentable simply because it contains a law of nature or a
mathematical algorithm." 35 But the Court in Flook nevertheless held that
the invention at issue, a method for updating "alarm limits" in connection
with catalytic conversion, was unpatentable-despite the fact that a patent
would not have precluded all uses of the underlying algorithm and that the
claims included the post-solution step of adjusting the alarm value to the
updated number calculated by use of the algorithm (because the post-
solution step was "conventional or obvious").
Four years later, however, the Court reversed course in Diamond v.
Diehr.37 At issue in Diehr was the patentability of a process for curing
rubber, using a computer to repeatedly calculate an algorithm, the Ar-
rhenius equation, that is useful for determining the appropriate cure time
and that had long been known in the art. 38 This time, the Court viewed the
invention at issue as unequivocally a statutory (i.e., potentially patentable)
"process." Quoting the Court's 1877 decision in Cochrane v. Deener, the
Court defined a process as "a mode of treatment of certain materials to
produce a given result," "an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the
subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state or
thing.",39 (As we shall see, the question of whether a statutory process
must effect a physical transformation-and if so, exactly what this
33. Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 64.
34. Id. at 72.
35. Flook, 437 U.S. at 590.
36. Id. The Court noted the Patent Board of Appeals' application of a "point of nov-
elty" test, under which the patent eligibility of a process depends on the patentability of
the step or steps that are distinct from the prior art. See id. at 587-88. It purported not to
apply that test itself, stating that the Court's approach is "not at all inconsistent with the
view that a patent claim must be considered as a whole," but rather reflects the fact that
there was no inventive concept in the application other than the algorithm. Id. at 593-94.
37. 450 U.S. 175 (1982). Justice Rehnquist authored the 5-4 majority opinion of the
Court. Justice Stevens dissented and was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Blackmun. See id. at 193.
38. See id. at 177-78.
39. Id. at 183 (quoting Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 787-88 (1877)); see also
id. at 184 (describing the invention at issue as "a physical and chemical process for mold-
ing precision synthetic rubber products," involving the transformation of raw materials
into a different state or thing).
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means--or whether the quotation from Cochrane is merely illustrative of
one type of statutory process, remains controversial.) The Court reasoned
that the invention was not rendered non-statutory merely by virtue of the
fact that several of its steps employed a mathematical equation and a com-
puter, and noted that those claims did not preempt all uses of the Ar-
rhenius equation. 40 And while the Court restated the Flook propositions
that mathematical principles by themselves are unpatentable, and that "in-
significant post-solution activity will not transform an unpatentable prin-
ciple into a patentable process,"' 41 the Court chastised the examiner for
concluding that the invention at issue was unpatentable because all of the
steps other than the use of the computer were known in the art42-thus
arguably laying to rest the point of novelty test.
In the years immediately following Diehr, the fledgling United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit struggled to interpret the stan-
dards announced in Diehr with respect to the patentability of computer-
related art.43 In the landmark case of In re Alappat, the Federal Circuit,
sitting en banc, articulated an expansive scope of patent eligibility for
computer-related art.44 In Alappat the inventor claimed as his invention a
machine that, when programmed to perform an algorithm he had devel-
oped, would improve the electronic waveform displayed on a digital oscil-
loscope. 45 The USPTO had rejected the claims, reasoning that an inven-
tion claiming a computer programmed to perform a series of calculations
and output data was indistinguishable from an unpatentable mathematical
46algorithm. The Federal Circuit, however, reversed on the ground that
Alappat's invention fell within the statutory category of a "machine." 47 In
so holding, the court cited the Supreme Court's opinion in Diamond v.
Chakrabarty--which held that human-created life forms constitute pat-
entable subject matter-for the proposition that Congress intended § 101
to encompass any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or com-
40. See id. at 187.
41. Id. at 191-92.
42. See id. at 188-89. The Court stated that the questions of whether the invention
was novel and whether it was nonobvious were separate from the question of whether the
invention fell within the scope of patentable subject matter. See id. at 190.
43. See, e.g., Arrhythmia Res. Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053 (Fed.
Cir. 1992); In re Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1989); see also In re Abele, 684 F.2d
982 (C.C.A.P. 1982).
44. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1542 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc).
45. See id. at 1537.
46. See id at 1539.
47. See id at 1544.
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position of matter that satisfied all of the other statutory criteria.48 The
court did not read the Supreme Court's trilogy of computer-related art
cases as establishing an "overly broad, fourth category of subject matter
excluded from § 101,,49 and instead interpreted those cases as standing for
the proposition that "certain types of mathematical subject matter, stand-
ing alone, represent nothing more than abstract ideas until reduced to
some type of practical application., 50 Thus, the proper focus is on whether
the claim as a whole recites patentable subject matter, and not whether it
contains some elements that would be unpatentable by themselves.5 1 Ap-
plying these criteria to Alappat's invention, the court concluded that the
claimed machine was not a "disembodied mathematical concept," but
rather a specific machine that produced a "useful, concrete, and tangible
result.,
52
In the wake of Alappat, the USPTO in 1996 issued new Examination
Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions to assist examiners in deter-
mining whether applications reciting such inventions satisfy the criteria
for patentability.5 Those Guidelines have been amended in light of Ex
parte Lundgren, a case discussed below, 54 and are now incorporated in the
Manual of Patent Examining and Procedure as part of the Interim Guide-
lines for Examination of Patent Applications for Patent Subject Matter
Eligibility.55 Following Alappat, the general criterion set forth in the
Guidelines for distinguishing patentable from nonpatentable subject matter
is whether the invention carries out a useful, concrete, tangible result. 56 In
a nod to Gottschalk, a factor that remains useful in making this determina-
tion is whether use of the claimed invention would preempt all uses of an
idea. 7
48. See id. at 1542.
49. Id. at 1543.
50. Id.
51. See id. at 1544.
52. Id.
53. 61 Fed. Reg. 7478 (1996), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/-
compexam/examcomp.htm. The USPTO subsequently incorporated the Guidelines into
section 2106 of the Manual of Patent Examining and Procedure, and it has periodically
amended them, most recently in response to Ex parte Lundgren. 76 U.S.P.Q.2D 1385
(B.P.A.I. 2005). See MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING AND PROCEDURE § 2106 (8th rev.
ed. Aug. 2006) [hereinafter MPEP].
54. See infra text accompanying notes 79-104.
55. See MPEP, supra note 53, § 2106, at 2100-06.
56. See id at 2100-06, 2100-09.
57. See id at 2100-09. Until the August 2006 revision, the Guidelines also sug-
gested, in a nod to Flook and Diehr, that claims reciting only insignificant pre- or post-
solution steps might be unpatentable. See MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING AND PROCE-
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The culmination of the Federal Circuit's broad interpretation of Diehr
has been its decisions in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fi-
nancial Group, Inc.58 and AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc.
59
At issue in State Street Bank was an issued patent directed toward a data
processing system for implementing an investment structure developed for
use in the business of administering mutual funds. The district court held
that the claims were unpatentable as either mathematical algorithms or
business methods, but the Federal Circuit reversed. 61 Construing the Su-
preme Court trilogy as standing for the proposition "that mathematical al-
gorithms are not patentable subject matter to the extent that they are mere-
ly abstract ideas," 62 the court held that "to be patentable an algorithm must
be applied in a 'useful' way." 63 Notably, the court concluded that "the
transformation of data, representing discrete dollar amounts, by a machine
through a series of mathematical calculations into a final share price" con-
stituted a "practical application of a mathematical algorithm, formula, or
calculation, because it produces a 'useful, concrete, and tangible result'-a
final share price momentarily fixed for recording and reporting pur-
poses." 64 Thus, "[t]he question of whether a claim encompasses statutory
subject matter should not focus on which of the four categories a claim is
directed to ... but rather on the essential characteristics of the subject mat-
ter, in particular, its practical utility."
65
In addition, the court laid to rest what it described as the "ill-
conceived" business methods exception, noting that despite widespread
belief 66 that case law dating back to the nineteenth century had established
DURE § 2106, at 2100-15 to -16 (8th ed. rev. Aug. 2005) [hereinafter, August 2005
MPEP].
58. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
59. 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
60. State Street Bank, 149 F.3d at 1370.
61. Id. at 1372-73.
62. Id. at 1373 ("Unpatentable mathematical algorithms are identifiable by showing




65. Id. at 1375.
66. See, e.g., Robert A. Kreiss, Patent Protection for Computer Programs and Ma-
thematical Algorithms: The Constitutional Limitations on Patentable Subject Matter, 29
N.M. L. REv. 31, 85 (1999) (referring to "the repeated comments made by courts, com-
mentators, and the PTO over the years to the effect that business methods are not pat-
entable subject matter"); Leo J. Raskind, The State Street Bank Decision: The Bad Busi-
ness of Unlimited Patent Protection for Methods of Doing Business, 10 FORDHAM IN-
TELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 61, 61-62 & n.2 (1999) (noting that many of the earlier
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that business methods were unpatentable, neither the Federal Circuit nor
its predecessor Court of Customs and Patent Appeals had ever specifically
invoked that exception so as to render an invention unpatentable. 67 In-
stead, the court characterized each of the cases that appeared to rely on the
business methods exception as explainable on some other ground, such as
the rule against patenting abstract ideas. According to the court, at least
since the enactment of the 1952 Patent Act, "business methods have been,
and should have been, subject to the same legal requirements for pat-
entability as applied to any other process or method. ' ' 69 The following
year, the court in AT&T confirmed and extended State Street Bank by up-
holding the patentability of a process for generating a message record for
interexchange telephone calls. 70 Although the end result of the process
was the creation of a "signal useful for billing purposes,"' 71 the court re-
jected the argument that Diehr stood for the proposition that process
claims containing algorithms are patentable "only if there is a 'physical
transformation' or conversion of subject matter from one state into an-
other. ' ' 72 According to the court, physical transformation "is not an invari-
able requirement, but merely one example of how a mathematical algo-
rithm may bring about a useful application"; 73 the only requirement is that
the algorithm-containing process "as a whole, produces a tangible, useful,
result."
' 74
Notwithstanding these developments in the law accommodating com-
puter-related art, and their extension to business methods, the USPTO un-
til recently continued to cite Musgrave in its Examination Guidelines for
Computer-Related Inventions for the proposition that "[o]nly when the
claim is devoid of any limitation to a practical application in the techno-
logical arts should it be rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101."75 The Guidelines
themselves did not define the term "technological arts," however, giving
decisions rejecting claims to business methods could be explained on other grounds, but
nevertheless describing State Street Bank's wholesale rejection of the business methods
exception as "startling").
67. State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368,
1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
68. Id. at 1375-76.
69. Id. at 1375.
70. See AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc'ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1353 (Fed. Cir.
1999). Judge Plager authored the opinion; there were no dissenting opinions.
71. Id. at 1358.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1361.
75. August 2005 MPEP, supra note 57, § 2106, at 2100-7.
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examiners wide latitude to interpret patentable subject matter. Several pat-
ents that issued in the 1990s and early 2000s-including not only such no-
torious examples as a method for exercising a cat 76 and a method for
swinging on a swing, 77 but also to non-computer related business meth-
ods78 and even the occasional sports move -appeared to bear little if
any relationship to what most people would think of as "technology."
It therefore came as little surprise to many observers when in a recent
administrative law decision, Ex parte Lundgren,80 the USPTO's Board of
Patent Appeals and Interferences put to rest the technological arts excep-
tion.81 The invention at issue in Lundgren was a method for compensating
76. See U.S. Patent No. 5,443,036 (filed Nov. 2, 1993).
77. See U.S. Patent No. 6,368,227 (filed Nov. 17, 2000).
78. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,058,941 (filed June 18, 1999) (patenting a method of
taping and cutting hair); U.S. Patent No. 5,851,117 (filed Apr. 23, 1997) (patenting a me-
thod for training a janitor); U.S. Patent No. 6,014,975 (filed June 6, 1995) (patenting a
shaving method); U.S. Patent No. 6,607,389 (filed Dec. 3, 2001) (patenting a method for
selecting a jury).
79. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,993,336 (filed Mar. 31, 1998) (patenting a method of
executing a tennis stroke); U.S. Patent No. 5,616,089 (filed Mar. 29, 1996) (patenting a
method of putting). To be sure, many of the aforementioned patents and others falling
into the same categories have little if any commercial value, and therefore are a social
waste only to the extent they clutter up the system. But one cannot assume a priori that all
non-technological inventions are so trivial as to never be enforced, or that enforcement
would never interfere with other important interests. To my knowledge, for example, no
one has yet sought to patent a new baseball pitch, but it may be only a matter of time be-
fore someone attempts to do so. See HAROLD SEYMOUR, BASEBALL: THE EARLY YEARS
(1960) (discussing the debate over which nineteenth century pitcher invented the curve-
ball); Posting of Brett Bull to SI.com, Unwinding the Gyroball,
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2007/writers/the-bonus/0 1/25/matsuzaka.gyroball/ind
ex.html (Jan. 30, 2007, 9:07 am) (reporting on a purportedly devastating pitch, the "gy-
roball," invented in Japan in the 1990s).
80. 76 U.S.P.Q.2D 1385 (B.P.A.I. 2005) (per curiam).
81. In so holding, however, the Board ruled contrary to an earlier non-precedential
opinion, Ex parte Bowman, 61 U.S.P.Q.2D 1669, 1671 (B.P.A.I. 2001), which held an
invention "which is not tied to any technological art, environment, or machine" to be an
unpatentable abstract idea.
Recently, an apparently contradictory but non-precedential opinion of the Board
of Patent Appeals and Interferences has come to light. See Ex parte Bilski, Appeal No.
2002-2257 (B.P.A.I. 2006), available at http:www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/its-
/fd022257.pdf. Like Lundgren, Bilski involved a business method that was not tied to any
particular technology and did not effect a physical transformation. See Bilski, supra, at 2.
The Board, in an opinion authored by Judge Barrett (one of the dissenting judges in
Lundgren, see infra text accompanying notes 89-96), purported to apply Judge Barrett's
analysis and held that the method did not constitute patentable subject matter. See Bilski,
supra, at 11, 41-53. The case is currently on appeal to the Federal Circuit. See Patent Law
Blog (Patently-O), BPAI 'Informative' Opinion on Business Method Patents,
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a firm manager for reducing the firm's exposure to the risk of antitrust li-
ability; none of the steps of the invention required the use of a computer or
other equipment. 82 The examiner had rejected the application on the
ground that the claims read on subject matter "outside the technological
arts, namely an economic theory expressed as a mathematical algorithm
without the disclosure or suggestion of computer, automated means, appa-
ratus of any kind .... ,83 In a brief per curiam opinion, however, the
Board reversed, citing AT&T for the proposition that "a process claim that
applies a mathematical algorithm to 'produce a useful, concrete, tangible
result without pre-empting other uses of the mathematical principle, on its
face comfortably falls within the scope of Section 101." 8 The Board re-
jected the examiner's determination "that there is a separate test for de-
termining whether claims are directed to statutory subject matter, i.e., a
'technological arts' test." 85 In the board's view, "there is currently no ju-
dicially recognized separate 'technological arts' test to determine patent
eligible subject matter under Section 101."86
Lundgren nevertheless elicited two strong dissents among the five ad-
ministrative law judges. In the first dissenting opinion, Judge Smith ar-
gued that "the term 'technological arts' should be construed to mean noth-
ing more than a threshold nexus to some field of technology," and that
such a requirement is implicit within the "constitutional mandate authoriz-
ing Congress to grant patents in order to promote the progress of the use-
ful arts. ' ' 87 In Judge Smith's view, "if the claims recite that the steps were
performed by a computer ... the claimed invention would at least have
met the constitutional 'technological arts' standard, although [it] would
still need to be analyzed under 35 U.S.C. Section 101 for conventional
compliance with that section of the statutes." 88 In a much lengthier sepa-
rate opinion, Judge Barrett expressed agreement with the majority's view
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2007/02/bpaiinformativ.html (Feb. 16, 2007); see also
Patent Prospector, Transformation,
http://www.patenthawk.com/blog/2007/02/transformationl.html (Feb. 19, 2007 , 5:13
pm) (quoting Harold C. Wegner asking, "[I]n the absence of any intervening judicial pre-
cedential to the contrary, on what basis can a new panel simply abrogate the 'preceden-
tial' Lundgren opinion?").
82. See Lundgren, 76 U.S.P.Q.2D at 1385-86.
83. Id. at 1386.
84. Id. (quoting AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc'ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed.
Cir. 1999)).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1388.
87. Id. (Smith, J., dissenting).
88. Id.
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"that there is no separate and distinct 'technological arts' test." 89 He also
saw no difficulty with permitting patents to issue on processes the steps of
which are completely performed by humans. 90 Judge Barrett nevertheless
dissented from the majority's implication that "the sole test for statutory
subject matter is the 'useful, concrete and tangible result' test." 9 He dis-
tinguished State Street Bank and AT&T on the ground that both of these
cases "involved transformation of data by a machine, such as a computer,"
whereas the claim at issue was "broad enough to read on performing the
steps without any machine or apparatus." 92 In Judge Barrett's view, a rule
that would conform both to the constitutional mandate to limit patents to
the "useful arts" and to the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit case law
would define patentable processes as processes that effect "a physical
transformation of subject matter (matter or energy) to a different state or
thing if it is not tied to a particular machine." 93 In light of the Federal Cir-
cuit cases, however, "the 'subject matter' transformed does not need to be
a physical (tangible) object or article or substance, but can be physical, yet
intangible, phenomena such as electrical signals or electromagnetic
waves." 94 Under this test, a process would not be patentable if it is ab-
stract, in the sense of not serving a useful purpose, or if it does not trans-
form matter or energy. 95 Processes that can be implemented by human ef-
fort without the use of any device and without transforming matter or en-
ergy external to the human actor would, on this view, be unpatentable,
even if useful. 
96
Judge Barrett's test therefore would incorporate the old mental steps
doctrine, but it would permit computer-related art to be patented as long as
the invention carries out a useful purpose, because computer-related art
necessarily involves the transformation of matter or energy. Further, this
test would permit human implemented processes to be patented as long as
89. Id. at 1389, 1390 (Barrett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (conclud-
ing that a technological arts test would be unworkable and unfair).
90. See id. at 1428-29.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1392.
93. Id. at 1401.
94. Id. at 1398. Judge Barrett's revision of the traditional "physical transformation"
test therefore would recognize many, perhaps most, computer-related inventions as fal-
ling within the domain of patentable subject matter. See also Alan L. Durham, "Useful
Arts " in the Information Age, 1999 BYU L. REV. 1419, 1464-65, 1513 (arguing that "any
'useful arts' distinction based on physicality is disturbingly superficial," and that many
software inventions "have little or no physical effects, yet are equally utilitarian").
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they transform matter or energy and are useful. 97 Process claims that are
drafted so as to read on either machine or human implementation would
have to satisfy both tests. 98 Judge Barrett's proposed test did not carry the
day, however. In conformity with the majority opinion, the new Interim
Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications for Patent Subject Mat-
ter Eligibility neither make reference to a technological arts requirement,
nor do they view physical transformation as a sine qua non.99 Consistent
with the position apparently taken by the Federal Circuit in cases such as
Alappat, State Street Bank, and AT&T, the USPTO now purports to apply
only the three criteria of useful (meaning that the claim is limited to a
practical application), tangible (defined to mean "not abstract"), and con-
crete (defined to mean "substantially repeatable"). 100
But perhaps the most anticipated development in the law of patent eli-
gibility in recent years turned out to be something of a non-event. In Feb-
ruary 2005, the United States Supreme Court surprised many observers by
inviting the Solicitor General to file a brief setting forth the views of the
United States on the question of whether the patent claim at issue in Labo-
ratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc., was
invalid by reason of the rule that laws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas are unpatentable. 101 Contrary to the Solicitor General's ad-
97. See id Judge Barrett's dissent may have a good deal to recommend it. See infra
text accompanying note 193.
98. See id
99. See MPEP, supra note 53, § 2106, at 2100-11.
100. See id. How far the Federal Circuit is willing to go with respect to patentable
subject matter may be tested in the pending case of In re Nuijten. In Nuijten, the USPTO
rejected a claim to a "signal with embedded supplemental data, the signal being encoded
in accordance with a given encoding process and selected samples of the signal represent-
ing the supplemental data, and at least one of the samples preceding the selected samples
is different from the sample corresponding to the given encoding process," on the ground
that a signal is not an article of manufacture or composition of matter. See John F. Duffy,
In re Nuijten: Patentable Subject Matter, Textualism and the Supreme Court, available at
http://www.bustpatents.com/seclOl/nuij-duf.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2007); Harold
Wegner, 35 USC § 101 "Electrical Signal" Patent-Eligibility Test Case, IPFRONTLINE,
Aug. 9, 2006, http://www.ipfrontline.com/depts/article.asp?id=12151 &deptid=4. Profes-
sor Duffy argues that the claim does recite patentable subject matter because the terms
"composition of matter" and "manufacture" mean anything that is neither imaginary nor
spiritual. See Duffy, supra. On the other hand, the claim at issue in Nuijten seems more
clearly than the claim at issue in Lundgren to fall within the everyday meaning of "tech-
nological arts" or, as Professor Duffy puts it, "clever engineering." Id. A reversal in Nui-
jten therefore might not require calling Lundgren into question. The Federal Circuit heard
oral argument in Nuijten in February 2007. See id.
101. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921, 2925
(2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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vice, the Court then granted certiorari on the question of whether the pat-
ent claim at issue was invalid on the ground that it resulted in "a monopoly
over a basic scientific relationship ... such that any doctor necessarily in-
fringes the patent merely by thinking about the relationship after looking
at a test result."1 02 The inventors in Metabolite had discovered a naturally-
occurring correlation between the level of homocysteine, an amino acid, in
human bodily fluid, and deficiencies of folate and cobalamin.' 03 They then
obtained a patent which, in relevant part, claimed a method for diagnosing
whether a subject suffers from a folate or colabamin deficiency, compris-
ing (1) testing for the presence of an elevated level of homocysteine; and
(2) correlating an elevated level of homocysteine with a folate and co-
balamin deficiency. 104 The assignee of the ensuing patent filed suit against
LabCorp for inducing physicians to infringe the patent. The district court
entered judgment for the assignee, and the Federal Circuit affirmed. The
court, however, failed to address whether the claim, construed to read on a
physician's use of any test for homocysteine and subsequent correlation,
impermissibly covered a law of nature, i.e., the relationship between ele-
vated homocysteine levels and vitamin deficiencies. 
105
The parties presented oral argument before the Court in early 2006, but
the Court thereafter dismissed the writ as improvidently granted. 106 In dis-
sent, however, Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens and Souter, ar-
gued against dismissing the writ, despite the fact that LabCorp had not
pressed the law of nature argument at trial and the Federal Circuit had ex-
pressed no opinion on the matter. 107 Justice Breyer then argued that, de-
spite the occasional difficulty of distinguishing between natural phenom-
ena and their applications, the present case was "not at the boundary": the
patent claim at issue, in other words, was indistinguishable from the natu-
ral phenomenon of the correlation between high levels of homocysteine
and folate or cobalamin deficiency. 18 Justice Breyer also noted that the
claim did not involve any "physical transformation of matter," though
without deciding whether patentable processes must involve such trans-
formations. 109 He also expressed doubt on State Street Bank's implicationthat processes are patentable as long as they produce a "useful, concrete,
102. See id. at 2925.
103. See id. at 2922.
104. See id. at 2924.
105. See id. at 2924-25.
106. Id. at 2921. As is often the case, the Court offered no reason for its decision to
dismiss the writ as improvidently granted.
107. See id. at 2925 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 2927.
109. See id.
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tangible result," suggesting that this test would have been met in Gott-
schalk and Flook, as well as in the famous Morse case. 
110
Given the Court's apparent interest in the issues raised in Metabolite,
however, it may not be long before the Court grants certiorari in a similar
case that more carefully preserves those issues for appellate review. Doing
so would allow for some probing of whether the standards developed by
the Federal Circuit and the USPTO in the years following Diehr have ex-
tended the scope of patentable subject matter too far. For the time being,
however, neither the Federal Circuit nor the USPTO appears motivated to
step back from the principles that patentable subject matter may pertain to
non-technological arts, may read on mental steps, and need not effect any
conventional physical transformation."' This trend has extended pat-
entable subject matter beyond the boundaries that most observers would
have considered proper a generation ago, as well as beyond the boundaries
followed today by other jurisdictions such as the European Patent Office
(EPO).
III. SOME BURKEAN-INSPIRED OBJECTIONS TO THE
CONTEMPORARY TREND
On one level, all of the preceding developments-the elimination of
the mental steps and technological arts doctrines, as well as any require-
ment that there be a physical transformation of matter-seem reasonable.
After all, the Patent Act makes no mention of these doctrines, and courts
may be correct in inferring that Congress intended the scope of patentable
110. See id. at 2928. In O'Reilly v. Morse, the Supreme Court rejected claim 8 as-
serted by Samuel F.B. Morse, inventor of the telegraph, directed to "the use of the motive
power of the electric or galvanic current, which I call electro-magnetism, however devel-
oped, for making or printing intelligible characters, letters, or signs, at any distances." 56
U.S. 62, 112-20 (1854). The case is sometimes read as implicating the principle that laws
of nature are unpatentable, though others believe that a better rationale for the result is
that the inventor could not enable others to practice unforeseeable embodiments of claim
8's inventive principle. See Oddi, supra note 28, at 514.
111. Only the Nuijten case so far appears contrary to the trend, but as noted above it
turns more on the question of whether signals are compositions of matter or manufactures
than on their relation to technology. See supra note 100. Note also that the Supreme
Court, or at least some members of the Court, may find reason to express an opinion on
the patentability of software-related art in the pending case of Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T
Corp., No. 05-1056 (argued Feb. 21, 2007). Although the case hinges on the Court's in-
terpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 271(f), during oral argument three justices raised the question
of whether software itself is patentable subject matter. See Transcript of Oral Argument,
Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., No. 05-1056, available at http://www.supreme-
courtus.gov/oralarguments/argument-transcripts/05-1065.pdf, at 13 (question of Justice
Scalia); id. at 22 (question of Justice Breyer); id. at 26 (question of Justice Stevens).
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subject matter to be broad. 112 The doctrines themselves may appear arbi-
trary and subject to capricious interpretation. Who is to say what counts as
a physical transformation? In a material universe, every process will cause
some sort of physical transformation, if only at the microscopic level or
within the human body, including the brain. As noted above, courts never
had a clear understanding of the mental steps doctrine," 3 and reasonable
minds may well differ on the subject of what falls within the technological
arts. 114 One may also question whether these now-disfavored doctrines
really were part of any firmly-rooted patent law tradition. The mental steps
doctrine, as noted above, does not appear in any reported case prior to the
twentieth century. 1 5 In State Street Bank, the Federal Circuit was able to
distinguish earlier cases rejecting patents on business methods on some
other ground or grounds." 6 The Supreme Court may not have intended the
dictum in Cochrane v. Deener that processes must involve physical trans-
formations to provide a definitive, limiting definition of what constitutes a
patentable process. 117
Moreover, to the extent that one can read the old doctrines as closing
off entire new fields, such as computer-related arts, from the scope of pat-
ent protection, they seem arbitrary and short-sighted. Investment in new
areas of endeavor may benefit humankind. 118 On this view, the modem,
rational step was to eliminate these archaic doctrines altogether, and to
focus on encouraging the invention and disclosure of any and all subject
matter so long as it is useful, practical, and sufficiently predictable in its
112. Some observers have argued that the constitutional text authorizing Congress to
enact patent laws to "promote the progress of ... the useful arts," U.S. CONST. art. I, §8,
cl. 8, might require that patentable subject matter be limited to the technological arts, as
being synonymous with "useful arts." See Ex parte Lundgren, 76 U.S.P.Q.2D 1385
(B.P.A.I. 2005) (Smith, J., dissenting); Malla Pollack, The Multiple Unconstitutionality of
Business Method Patents: Common Sense, Congressional Consideration, and Constitu-
tional History, 28 RUTGERS COMP. & TECH. L.J. 61, 90 (2002). But see Edward Walter-
scheid, "Within the Limits of the Constitutional Grant": Constitutional Limitations on the
Patent Power, 9 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 291, 350, 354 (2002) (arguing that the useful arts are
not limited to the technological arts, but rather to any functional subject matter).
113. See supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text.
114. See Ex part Lundgren, 76 U.S.P.Q.2D 1385, 1389-90 (B.P.A.I. 2005) (per cu-
riam) (Barrett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
115. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
116. See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368,
1375-77 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
117. See 1 CHIsUM, supra note 17, §1.03[6].
118. Accord Durham, supra note 94, at 1514 (arguing, for example, that search en-
gine and virus detection algorithms are "tools for the analysis, manipulation, and trans-
formation of data" and "should be considered at the core of patentable subject matter").
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effects. Indeed, some advocates of an expansive view of patentable subject
matter have argued that even the current rules may not be expansive
enough. The amicus brief filed by the Franklin Pierce Law Center in Me-
tabolite argued in favor of eliminating the "law of nature" exclusion.' 19 In
a related vein, John Schlicher-a practitioner and scholar whose work has
greatly influenced my own-has questioned the need for a utility require-
ment, reasoning that patents on useless inventions would have no value
and therefore would impose little social cost. 120 For all we know, they
may be right: the social benefits of these doctrines may be minimal, and
the costs of continuing with them may be high, if they discourage, at the
margin, some researchers from conducting the sort of basic research that
might lead to the discovery of new laws of nature lacking any immediate
practical application. On this view, a rational system would permit pat-
entable subject matter to expand into every nook and cranny of human en-
deavor, and would rely exclusively upon other patent doctrines, such as
nonobviousness, to weed out the trivial.
And yet there are reasons to question whether this rational, orderly
scenario is entirely correct. Arguments that there is no textual basis within
the Patent Act for mental steps or other limiting doctrines only go so far,
even if we put aside contrary arguments that there is a constitutional basis
for some or all of these limitations. 121 Much of patent law traditionally has
been judge-made: consider, for example, the evolution of the nonobvious-
ness doctrine prior to its codification in 1952; 122 the first sale doctrine; 123
the exclusion of laws of nature and naturally-occurring physical phenom-
ena; 124 the doctrine of non-statutory double patenting; 125 or the Federal
119. See Brief for Franklin Pierce Law Center as Amicus Curiae, supra note 14, at 6-
11.
120. See 1 JOHN W. SCHLICHER, PATENT LAW: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES
§ 3.3 (2d ed. 2005); 2 JOHN W. SCHLICHER, PATENT LAW: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRIN-
CIPLES § 13.22 (2d ed. 2005).
121. See supra note 112.
122. See Graham v. John Deere & Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5-16 (1966) (discussing the evolu-
tion of the "inventiveness" doctrine prior to the codification of the nonobviousness doc-
trine in 1952, though also suggesting that inventiveness or nonobviousness may be a con-
stitutional requirement).
123. The first-sale doctrine entitles the owner of a lawfully-made article embodying
the patented invention to use and resell the article, without permission of the patent own-
er, unless the patent owner has validly conditioned the sale of that article in some relevant
respect. See, e.g., Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 706-08 (Fed. Cir.
1992). It has never been explicitly codified in the Patent Act.
124. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447
U.S. 303, 308 (1980).
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Circuit's "useful, concrete, and tangible" test, the latter two portions of
which have neither a textual basis nor are interpreted to mean what those
terms mean in ordinary discourse. 126 And while doctrines such as techno-
logical arts or mental steps may lack a long pedigree as measured by ex-
plicit statements in the case law, the absence of such statements may sim-
ply reflect a widespread, unchallenged understanding that patentable sub-
ject matter did not extend so far. 127
125. Under the doctrine of non-statutory double patenting, one may not patent an
obvious variation of one's own patented invention, absent the filing of a terminal dis-
claimer under which the second patent covering the obvious variation expires on the
same date as the first patent. See Geneva Pharms., Inc. v. Glaxosmithkline PLC, 349 F.3d
1373, 1377-78 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
126. See supra text accompanying note 100.
127. See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVEN-
TIONS § 66, at 101 n.2 (1890) (citing with approval Morton v. N.Y Eye Infirmary, 17 F.
Cas. 879 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862) (holding invalid a patent on "a method of rendering pa-
tients insensible to pain during surgical operations," despite the fact that the invention
"conferred inestimable benefits upon the whole race of man")); Robert I. Coulter, The
Field of the Statutory Useful Arts, Part II, 34 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 487, 494, 505 (1952)
(arguing that, in historic context, the "useful arts" are distinct from the liberal and fine
arts, and also that "mental operations per se ... are not patentable," although "practical
technological methods which provide modes or means linking elemental agencies (in-
cluding the human mind) to produce the useful result" are); Pamela Samuelson, Benson
Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection for Algorithms and Computer Software,
39 EMORY L.J. 1025, 1036 n.34 (1990) (noting little explanation, in judicial opinions, for
the mental steps doctrine, but proposing that "this lack of explanation instead may be a
sign of how far outside the bounds of the patent system mental processes are perceived to
be"); John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1139,
1142, 1145-47, 1164 (1999) (referring to "our long-held sense of the reach of the patent
system" as "somehow cabin[ing] the scope of patentable subject matter," and citing nine-
teenth and twentieth century case law articulating a physical instantiation requirement).
To be sure, even if such an understanding existed relatively early on, it would not neces-
sarily bind modem-day courts; arguments for tradition always beg the question concern-
ing the level of generality at which the tradition should be considered binding. See Sun-
stein, supra note 5, at 381. Many observers today might disagree, for example, with the
specific holding of Morton v. N.Y. Eye Infirmary, 17 F. Cas. 879 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862)
(though even today medical methods, though patentable, are not generally enforceable,
see 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)), to say nothing of other patent-limiting cases (including Parker v.
Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978)) that rest upon what John Duffy and Robert Merges refer to
as the "nature's library" fallacy, i.e., that applications of a newly discovered law of nature
may be obvious if the law of nature itself is considered part of the prior art. See ROBERT
P. MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 108 (3d
ed. 2002). But as I argue above, courts also should consider the possibility that the as-
sumptions underlying some of the now-disfavored doctrines embodied a degree of under-
appreciated wisdom that we should not be too quick to jettison entirely.
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To the extent there was some such common understanding, by the
mid-twentieth century and quite possibly much earlier, regarding the lim-
ited scope of patentable subject matter, a Burkean perspective might sug-
gest that we should not be too quick to discard that understanding alto-
gether absent some compelling need. As I suggested in the Introduction, I
am speaking here not of Burke's specific views on the political and social
issues of his day, but rather of the Burkean attitude of prudence: the idea
that traditional practices may embody the unarticulated and underappreci-
ated wisdom of many people and many times, and that changes from tradi-
tion should be undertaken, when necessary, with due regard to that wis-
dom. Taking a page from Oakeshott, 128 I also do not contend that any spe-
cific results necessarily flow from traditional conservativism; practical
wisdom cannot be reduced to mere technique. What I will suggest, more in
the nature of a conversation or discussion, are some ways in which a Bur-
kean-inspired appreciation for the latent wisdom of tradition and custom
might be useful in approaching some of the recent controversies over pat-
entable subject matter. To the extent that old limitations embodied a de-
gree of wisdom-and to the extent no one has yet articulated a compelling
policy reason, such as a perceived underinvestment in the production of
non-technological processes, in favor of the wholesale jettisoning of these
traditional rules--courts might be well-advised to reconsider some of
these rules. 129 At the same time, nothing in this Burkean-inspired ap-
proach suggests that the law of patents ought to be frozen at the time of
some mythical golden age. Patent law must keep pace with the times, and
it probably would be inadvisable-as well as a likely violation of the
128. See supra note 3.
129. Put another way, no one is sufficiently well-informed to know how to craft the
patent eligibility requirement so as to maximize the surplus of social benefits over social
costs. Although it is conceivable that defining the scope of patentable subject matter very
broadly--even doing away with the requirement altogether-might induce more inven-
tion, discovery, and disclosure, it also may induce more transaction, monopoly, and rent-
seeking costs. The marginal payoff may well be negative, in light of other incentives to
discovery (such as fame, prizes, and direct or other indirect subsidies) and the potentially
exponential increase in transaction costs in particular. Unfortunately, this observation
does not tell us precisely how to differentiate patentable from unpatentable subject mat-
ter; indeed, the question may defy empirical analysis. One must rely in large part upon
non-verifiable assumptions concerning the likely consequences, including unintended
consequences, of legal rules. The Burkean perspective suggests that tradition provides a
set of such assumptions, departures from which should be based upon evidence that mod-
ifications are necessary to adapt the law to changing times, rather than upon some per-
ceived need to conform patent law to some model of Cartesian rationality.
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TRIPs Agreement 3°-to exclude computer and business-related art from
the scope of patent eligibility altogether. Reintroducing some of the tradi-
tional limitations on patent eligibility, though subject, as we shall see, to
appropriate reforms, might restore some needed balance to the system. In
particular, one may view the physical transformation, mental steps, and
technological arts requirements as embodying principles which still merit
respect, even if not absolute fidelity. Among these principles are the fol-
lowing.
Laws of nature and basic research should remain unpatentable, and
efforts should be made to ensure that clever patent drafting does not evis-
cerate this principle. As suggested above, even this time-honored princi-
ple is not completely unassailable from a utilitarian standpoint. Allowing
patents to issue on laws of nature or other tools of basic research-which
currently fall outside the scope of patentability, both as a matter of pat-
entable subject matter doctrine and under the current understanding of the
utility doctrine 31-might conceivably encourage some additional invest-
ment in their discovery. Nevertheless, the principle that laws of nature and
basic research should remain outside the patent system is also clearly ra-
tional, in light of both the potential for a contrary rule to generate enor-
mous social costs and the availability of other time-honored means, such
as direct government subsidies, for inducing basic discoveries. Indeed, a
rule forbidding the patenting of laws of nature and basic research rests
comfortably within a web of traditional limitations on patentability, in-
cluding not only utility but also the inherency doctrine,1 32 which rests in
part upon similar assumptions concerning the value of a more limited role
of the patent system in facilitating basic research. Patents on laws of na-
130. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 9, art. 27 (subject to certain permissible ex-
ceptions, "patents shall be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in
all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step, and are
capable of industrial application"). Note, however, that the TRIPs Agreement does appear
to permit restricting patents to "fields of technology."
131. See In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Indeed, the best response
to Schlicher's argument against the utility doctrine is precisely this: by requiring basic
research tools and other fundamental building blocks to remain in the public domain, the
utility doctrine performs a function more important than merely discouraging investment
in useless, and presumably valueless, invention.
132. The inherency doctrine forbids the patenting of discoveries which are inherently
present in the prior art, regardless of whether the benefits of the discovery have been pre-
viously appreciated, as long as the public has been deriving the benefits of the discovery
all along. Although the case law has long been marked by confusion, the more recent
Federal Circuit decisions have reconciled the competing strands along these lines. See,
e.g., Toro Co. v. Deere & Co., 355 F.3d 1313, 1320-21 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Dan L. Burk &
Mark A. Lemley, Inherency, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 371 (2005).
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ture would also lead to administrative difficulties and would intrude upon
personal autonomy in troubling ways. Had Sir Isaac Newton been able to
patent the law of gravity, for example, how exactly would he have been
capable of excluding others from using it, and should society have let him
try? Perhaps patent eligibility standards can be one tool for ensuring
against clever "drafting around" that claims as one's invention all or most
practical applications of such a physical law.
When possible, the patent system should strive to avoid conflicts with
free speech, copyright, privacy, and other important competing interests.
As other scholars have noted, an overly expansive eligibility standard may
result in the granting of patents that threaten to invade free speech, pri-
vacy, or other constitutionally-protected rights. Dan Burk, for example,
has noted that, to the extent that software embodies expression that is enti-
tled to a degree of First Amendment protection, patents that read on com-
peting software products-that is, that render competing products infring-
ing and thus potentially subject to an injunction-raise potentially disturb-
ing constitutional issues.'3 3 These issues may be more problematic in the
context of patent than copyright law, insofar as copyright only protects
original expression (or selection or arrangement), and not its functional
equivalents. 134 The famous idea/expression dichotomy 135 helps to ensure
that copyright rights do not intrude too far upon the First Amendment
guarantee of freedom of speech. 136 A patent claim that is drafted broadly
enough, by contrast, will read on a functionally-equivalent invention, ei-
133. See Dan L. Burk, Patenting Speech, 79 TEX. L. REv. 99, 150 (2000).
134. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a), (b) (2000).
135. The basic principle is that copyright subsists in an author's original expression
of ideas or fact, or in her original selection or arrangement of those ideas or facts, but not
in the ideas or facts themselves. See Thomas F. Cotter, Memes and Copyright, 80 TUL. L.
REv. 331, 354 (2006) (citing sources).
136. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003); Harper & Row Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985). This is not to say that copyright doctrine
necessarily makes sufficient accommodations to freedom of speech; the point is arguable,
to say the least. See, e.g., Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First
Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REv. 1, 13 (2001); Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagi-
nation: Copyright's Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1, 5 (2002). Determining precisely
where expression leaves off and idea begins is not easy, because copyright covers not
only exact copying but also substantially similar copying. See, e.g., Arnstein v. Porter,
154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946). But copyright at least makes an effort to reconcile
property rights with free speech rights. Because patent rights are generally broader in
scope than copyrights, however, and because patent law lacks anything resembling a fair
use defense, there is no obvious way to address the potential conflict of patent law and
the First Amendment in cases in which that conflict arises.
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ther literally or under the doctrine of equivalents. 137 When patents covered
only traditional forms of technology, the broader scope of patent rights
rarely presented a conflict with other bodies of law; now that patents and
copyrights sometimes both read on the same subject matter, however, the
potential for patent law to negate the public's right to incorporate non-
copyrightable ideas into competing software products can present formi-
dable difficulties in accommodating the competing interests. 138 Burk
therefore suggests that "[t]he introduction of expressive subject matter into
patent law may require revival or reformation" of either the mental steps
or printed matter doctrine, "in order to re-establish the line between func-
tion and expression in patentable subject matter." 139 In a related vein,
Kevin Collins argues that strict liability for patents that would render in-
fringing the (possibly involuntary) act of thinking raises constitutional
problems, although for Collins the principal problem is that such patents
effectively remove subject matter from the public domain. That is, if the
point of novelty subsists only in the mental step, as in the claim at issue in
Metabolite, a patent effectively renders it impossible to use subject matter
(e.g., a naturally-existing correlation between two phenomena) that itself
is nonpatentable subject matter. 40
But John Thomas has pointed to what is perhaps the most serious
problem posed by the expansion of patentable subject matter, namely its
potential impact upon personal liberties.141 As Thomas notes, patents in
recent years have claimed among other things methods for terminating
137. The defendant's product or process infringes under the doctrine of equivalents if
that product or process contains each element found in the patented invention, or the sub-
stantial equivalent thereof; an element is the substantial equivalent of another if a person
of ordinary skill in the art would know that the substituting element is interchangeable
with the substituted element. See Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520
U.S. 17, 37 (1997).
138. At least in some contexts, the U.S. Supreme Court has been reluctant to interpret
federal intellectual property laws in such a way as to negate rights that it views as being
conferred upon the public under other federal intellectual property laws. See, e.g., Dastar
Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 34-35 (2003); TrafFix Devices,
Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32 (2001). Enforcement of the printed matter
doctrine remains one way of trying to keep patent and copyright separate. See supra note
15 (discussing the printed matter doctrine). However, ascertaining the boundaries of that
doctrine can be quite difficult. See Burk, supra note 133, at 141-45.
139. Burk, supra note 133, at 161.
140. See Kevin Emerson Collins, The Problem of Insufficient Thought Control: Re-
flexive Thought and Constructive Nonvolition in Patent Law 54-56 (unpublished manu-
script, on file with author).
141. See John R. Thomas, Liberty and Property in Patent Law, 39 Hous. L. REV.
569, 570 (2002).
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pregnancy, for advising clients with respect to tax and regulatory compli-
ance, and for various methods of communication (including, but not lim-
ited to, methods of advertising). 14 2 In many instances, constitutional prin-
ciples would almost certainly preclude the government from directly pro-
hibiting the practices that comprise the subject matter of these patents, and
yet the owner of an enforceable patent on a method for inducing abortion,
providing tax advice, or advertising a product could obtain an injunction
forbidding others from the unauthorized practice of the very same con-
duct. 143 Whether constitutional law itself should play a role in constraining
the courts from enforcing patents that implicate personal liberty interests
presents difficult questions concerning the interpretation of the state action
doctrine, among other things. 144 Thomas himself argues that "the fashion-
ing of a subconstitutional restraint seems the best way" to accommodate
the competing interests, 145 and in other work has argued in favor of retain-
ing the technological arts and physical transformation doctrines as a way
to stem the tide of liberty-intrusive patents. 146 To some extent, these tradi-
tional limitations on patentable subject matter may have implicitly recog-
nized the value in protecting liberty interests from being undermined by
the patent system. 4 7 The liberty-intrusive patents Thomas decries have
little to do with technological arts or physical transformations, at least not
within the conventional meaning of those terms.
The virtue of redundancy. Many of the legal standards that have grown
up around patent eligibility make use of concepts that one can already find
in other patent doctrines, most notably utility and inherency. As noted
above, like patent eligibility one can understand the utility requirement as
a tool for ensuring that basic research remains in the public domain. 148 So
too can inherency, which properly understood prevents inventors from
142. See id. at 580-90.
143. See id at 592 (characterizing as a "disturbing question" the issue of whether
patents may "restrict personal liberties in ways that legislation cannot").
144. See id. at 592-619.
145. Id. at 609.
146. See Thomas, supra note 127, at 1143, 1175.
147. To be sure, modem-day Burkeans may disapprove of constitutional doctrine that
recognizes, among other things, a penumbral constitutional right to privacy and free
speech rights that permit flag-buming and the distribution of pornographic materials-or
they may not, to the extent that these rights, whether legitimate or not in their inception,
have become long-settled artifacts of the constitutional landscape. See Sunstein, supra
note 5, at 368-69, 392-94. My point is merely that, to the extent our legal traditions em-
brace a degree of respect for personal autonomy, freedom of speech, and other liberty
interests, however one interprets them, the potential for patent law of all things to inter-
fere with these interests ought to be a matter of concern.
148. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
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claiming inventions the benefits of which the public has been enjoying,
albeit unwittingly, prior to the inventor's discovery of the natural principle
at issue. 149 Although this observation might lead one to conclude that a
rational patent system could rely exclusively upon these other doctrines to
weed out inventions which, for policy reasons, should remain unpat-
entable, the existence of other doctrines that embody common assump-
tions on the limited role of the patent system may provide greater confi-
dence in the value of restraint. Moreover, redundancy provides some as-
surance that, even if one doctrine is misapplied in a given instance, an-
other will serve as a backup to attain the correct outcome.'
1 50
All of this reasoning leads me to conclude that, despite some potential
drawbacks, the technological arts, mental steps, and physical transforma-
tion doctrines may have possessed some underappreciated virtues. Aban-
doning them entirely, in the interest of attaining a more rational, logical
patent system, may well have been precipitate. And yet to state that these
doctrines may have possessed some latent merit does not necessitate that
they be revived in their original state. Times do change, after all, and legal
doctrines must change with them. In particular, an expansive reading of
the mental steps and physical transformation doctrines would render a
broad swath of computer-related art unpatentable, to the extent that the art
makes use of mathematical algorithms which, in theory, one could per-
form mentally, or transforms one set of data into another set of data. Al-
though some opponents of software patents might not mind seeing such
changes, in my view a radical return to the status quo ante would be just as
imprudent as staying the present course. Software-related inventions, after
all, can and do add substantial value to the economy. Moreover, such a
return might be difficult to reconcile with the TRIPs Agreement, which for
better or worse requires all member nations to make patents "available for
all inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology,
provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of
industrial application."'' 5 1 Reversing State Street Bank's rule in favor of
business method patents might involve similar problems, at least to the
extent some such methods relate to a "field[ ] of technology," and would
149. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
150. At the same time, policymakers must recognize that satisfaction of the patent
eligibility standard is only one of many requirements for patent protection. Many of the
common complaints concerning the patenting of computer-related art, for example, may
be better directed at problems involving nonobviousness and disclosure, rather than sub-
ject matter. See supra note 122 (discussing nonobviousness); Julie E. Cohen & Mark A.
Lemley, Patent Scope and the Software Industry, 89 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 13-14 (2001) (dis-
cussing disclosure).
151. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 9, art. 27.1.
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require legislative action insofar as Congress, in the wake of State Street
Bank, to enact a new provision to the Patent Act that makes specific refer-
ence to business method patents. 152 A more fruitful avenue for further
analysis therefore would be to investigate more carefully the circum-
stances under which these doctrines might play a useful, albeit altered,
role in the modem patent system.
IV. SOME MODEST STEPS TOWARD REFORM
I have chosen to focus my attention on three specific doctrines, namely
technological arts, mental steps, and physical transformation, as candi-
dates for a possible revival. Yet I have not said much to this point about
precisely how I envision these doctrines could be grafted back into exist-
ing law. None of these doctrines were clearly defined in the past, and in
any event a mindless return to past practice would probably, as I suggested
above, be unwarranted. At the same time, however, to try to define their
future contours definitively now would be arrogant; the wisdom of the
many is greater than that of any individual participant, including me. I
will, however, set forth some tentative observations on the ways in which
the law might incorporate some of the wisdom of the past, in the hope that
this exercise will stimulate others to build on this work and the work of
other scholars who have recently contributed to this ongoing discourse. I
first discuss technological arts and mental steps; I then, briefly, discuss
physical transformation.
A. Technological Arts and Mental Steps
An initial difficulty in implementing a technological arts requirement
lies in defining the term "technological arts," but those difficulties may be
exaggerated. Although there may never be a definition of technology that
everyone can agree upon completely, there are some serious candidates for
an adequate definition that would likely resolve the vast majority of cases.
Professor Thomas, for example, having canvassed the works of historians
and philosophers of technology as well as the case law of several other
countries, proposes as a working definition "the production or transforma-
tion of artifacts through the systematic manipulation of physical
152. See 35 U.S.C. § 273(b)(1) (1999) (exempting from liability a person who would
otherwise infringe a method patent, "if such person had, acting in good faith, actually
reduced the subject matter to practice at least one year before the effective filing date of
such patent, and commercially used the subject matter before the effective filing date of
such patent"); id § 273(a)(3) (defining the relevant method covered by this provision to
be "a method of doing or conducting business").
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forces."153 Alternatively, one version of an (ultimately defeated) European
Council Directive on computer-related patents would have defined tech-
nology as "the use of controllable forces of nature to achieve predictable
results." 154 And Professor Durham, arguing that software engineering
should be viewed as a branch of technology, would nevertheless limit pat-
entability to inventions which "reflect the programmer's art rather than
the non-technological art in whose service the programmer's art is em-
ployed."' 155 Thus, while there will undoubtedly be some cases at the mar-
gin, and not everyone will agree precisely where the boundary lies, it is
hard to believe that if more attention were focused on the matter, a worka-
ble definition would lie forever beyond our reach. The need to apply some
sort of "technological arts" criterion has hardly led other countries' and
regions' patent systems to grind to a halt; it is hard to see why it should be
an insurmountable obstacle for ours.
156
Assuming that we can agree upon a definition, a second problem, re-
lating also to mental steps, is to determine whether the USPTO should ap-
ply that definition to the invention as a whole or whether the USPTO
should apply some variation on the point of novelty approach instead. In
153. See Thomas, supra note 127, at 1142, 1178-80 (drawing upon definitions of
"capable of industrial application" in other nations' laws).
154. See European Parliament legislative resolution on the proposal for a directive of
the European Parliament and of the Council on the patentability of computer-
implemented inventions (COM(2002) 92-C5-082/2002-2002/0047(COD)), art. 2(c)
(Sept. 24, 2003), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=--
//EP//TEXT+TA+P5-TA-2003-0402+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN. As noted above, the
EPO-not to be confused with the European Council or the European Union-requires
patentable inventions to demonstrate a "technical effect," but as far as I can tell the term
is not defined in the European Patent Convention or regulations. See Case No. T 0931/95
- 3.5.1, at 16 (noting that "the meaning of the term 'technical' or 'technical character' is
not particularly clear," but that this is also true of the term "invention"; that "the fact that
the exact meaning of a term may be disputed does in itself not necessarily constitute a
good reason for not using that term as a criterion"; and finally that "case law may clarify
the issue").
155. Durham, supra note 94, at 1521-22 (emphasis added).
156. There is clearly some force, however, to the argument that the doctrines dis-
cussed in the text above can lead to unnecessary formalistic distinctions; for example, a
technological arts requirement might distinguish between (potentially patentable) systems
and (potentially unpatentable) methods, even if the underlying inventive principle is iden-
tical. See John A. Squires & Thomas S. Biemer, Patent Law 101: Does A Grudging
Lundgren Panel Decision Mean that the USPTO Is Finally Getting the Statutory Subject
Matter Question Right?, 46 IDEA 561, 567 (2006). Be that as it may, if a technological
arts requirement in general serves a beneficent purpose, some formalism may be an unin-
tended but manageable byproduct thereof It is hardly obvious that a rule favoring sys-
tems over methods will have any significant impact on patent incentives, particularly if
method claims can often be drafted as system claims, and vice versa.
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the present context, an "invention as a whole" approach would screen out
claims, such as the method claims at issue in Lundgren, that have no tech-
nological purpose and that can be performed by non-technological means.
If merely automating any process necessarily removes any technological
arts or mental steps impediment, however, the reform would not screen
out much else. It might be easy to evade such a rule without sacrificing
much claim breadth by simply drafting the claims so that the invention
must be performed technologically, for example by computer means.'
57
The invention as a whole approach also would do little, if anything, to re-
vive the mental steps doctrine; surely most process claims can be drafted
to include at least one step that need not, or must not, be performed men-
tally. For that matter, claims not so drafted might run afoul of whatever
remains of the mental steps doctrine today after Musgrave, without any
further reform.
All of this reasoning leads me to suggest that if technological arts and
mental steps are to perform a modest but non-negligible function in pre-
venting patents from intruding upon liberty and other important interests,
it might be more fruitful to reconsider application of a point of novelty
approach. To be sure, and as discussed in Part II, the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals disapproved of the point of novelty approach in Mus-
grave, 158 while the U.S. Supreme Court appears to have dispensed with it
in Diehr. 159 The arguments against the point of novelty approach appear in
many ways compelling. For one thing, the point of novelty approach ap-
pears to depart from standard concepts of novelty and nonobviousness,
which depend upon an evaluation of the subject matter as a whole in rela-
tion to the prior art, and not upon individual claim elements. 160 Courts can,
157. Depending on how one defines technology, even pencil and paper might provide
sufficient technological means. See Case T 0258/03 - 3.5.1, Hitachi (EPO Bd. App., Apr.
21, 2004), 4.6, available at http://legal.european-patent-office.org/dg3/pdf/t03-
025 8ep l.pdf. Requiring the invention as a whole to have a technological purpose, rather
than merely technological means, would avoid this problem but might still cover a vast
territory.
158. See In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 891 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
159. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 204-05 (1981). Note, however, that Pro-
fessor Collins defends his point of novelty approach, discussed infra notes 187-192 and
accompanying text, against the charge that it cuts against the grain of considering the
patent claim as a whole, on the grounds, inter alia, that Diehr's apparent disapproval of
the point of novelty approach can be interpreted narrowly. See Collins, supra note 27, at
55.
160. A claimed invention lacks novelty if, inter alia, another invention contains all of
the "elements" or "limitations" of the claimed invention, arranged in the same order. 35
U.S.C. § 103 (stating it is obvious if "the difference between the subject matter sought to
be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been
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and frequently do, find a combination of elements, each one of which is
found in the prior art, to be both novel and nonobvious when considered as
a whole. 161 And as the court suggested in Musgrave, the point of novelty
approach seems illogical in the sense that it contemplates that the very
same invention may fall within the scope of patentable subject matter at
one point in time, when the prior art is more limited in scope and thus does
not anticipate the non-mental or non-technological steps, but not at an-
other point when the prior art embraces those steps. 162
And yet as Holmes said and Burke might have said, "[t]he life of the
law has not been logic; it has been experience."' 63 Experience suggests
that a point of novelty test is not unworkable. For one thing, the USPTO
obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art");
see Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
161. See, e.g., Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 774 F.2d 1082, 1095 (Fed. Cir.
1985).
162. See In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 889 (C.C.P.A. 1970). Consider too the claim
at issue in Metabolite. If (Case 1) that claim comprised only the single limitation of test-
ing for the presence of an elevated level of homocysteine, it would constitute patentable
subject matter (but would be unpatentable for lack of novelty). If instead (Case 2) the
claim comprised the two steps of testing and correlating (as the actual claim at issue in
Metabolite did), then under a point of novelty test that would render the subject matter
unpatentable unless the point of novelty resides in steps other than the mental step. The
addition of the extra element would render the subject matter unpatentable. Addition of a
third step (Case 3)--for example, instructing the patient regarding the diagnosis of co-
balamin deficiency, or administering treatment for the deficiency-might bring the claim
back into patentable subject matter territory. This series of results-moving from pat-
entable subject matter in Case 1 to unpatentable subject matter in Case 2, then back to
patentable subject matter in Case 3-seems bizarre if one views patentable subject matter
as an ontological state. If on the other hand patentable subject matter is perceived as sim-
ply a legal conclusion, a label reflecting certain underlying policy determinations, the
conclusion is less odd. The relevant policies may counsel against patentability only in
Case 2 (though again, other policies, those reflected in the novelty doctrine, surely would
counsel against patentability in Case 1). But I concede that the result is inelegant and
untidy.
163. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Dover Publications 1991)
(1881). Holmes was not a respecter of tradition in the sense that Burke was. See Oliver
Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897) ("It is revolt-
ing to have no better reason for a rule of law than so it was laid down in the time of Hen-
ry IV."); Sunstein, supra note 5, at 398 (comparing and contrasting Holmes and Burke);
cf BuRKE, supra note 3, at 81 (describing jurisprudence as "the pride of human intellect,
which, with all its defects, redundancies, and errors, is the collected reason of ages, com-
bining the principles of original justice with the infinite variety of human concerns").
Neither Burke nor Holmes, however, as I understand them, had much patience with ef-
forts to conform law or other institutions to some grand, a priori theory.
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has continued to apply point of novelty in two limited contexts. 14 And the
European Patent Office (EPO) continues to apply a variation on the point
of novelty test to the present day to determine the patentability of com-
puter-related art. At issue in a recent EPO case on point, Hitachi,1 65 was
an automatic auction method carried out by means of a computer. The ex-
aminer had concluded that the method was a "business method as such,"
rather than an "invention," and thus fell outside the scope of patentable
subject matter under article 52(1) of the European Patent Convention. 166
Under a version of the point of novelty test, known as the "contribution
approach," that the EPO had articulated in some earlier cases, this conclu-
sion appeared correct. That approach advised the examiner to isolate the
"'new features' of an invention and features of that invention which are
known from the prior art," 167 and then determine whether the new fea-
tures, as opposed to the invention as a whole, exhibited a "technical char-
164. First, as noted above, the printed matter doctrine renders an invention unpat-
entable if the only distinction between the invention and the prior art is nonfunctional
descriptive material. See In re Ngai, 367 F.3d 1336, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Second, U.S.
courts continue to apply a point of novelty approach with respect to design patents. See
Lawman Armor Corp. v. Winner Int'l, L.L.C., 437 F.3d 1383, 1384-85 (Fed. Cir. 2006),
as clarified, 449 F.3d 1190, 1192 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Moreover, if the words "point of nov-
elty" set off too many alarms among the patent bar, maybe it would help to call it some-
thing else. In conversation, Richard Stern has suggested the use of the alternative term
"departure from the prior art."
165. Case T 0258/03 - 3.5.1, Hitachi (EPO Bd. App., Apr. 21, 2004), available at
http://legal.european-patent-office.org/dg3/pdf/tO3O258epl.pdf; see also Case T 0931/95
- 3.5.1, Pension Benefit Systems Partnership (EPO Bd. App. Sept. 8, 2000), 6, avail-
able at http://legal.european-patent-office.org/dg3/pdf/t95093 leul.pdf (rejecting also the
"contribution" approach, though not as definitively as in Hitachi). For a recent British
case declining to follow Hitachi, and instead applying a test that would exclude more
software and business-related inventions from the scope of patentable subject matter, see
Lord Justice Jacob's opinion in and appendix to Aerotel Ltd. v. Telco Holdings Ltd (U.K.
Ct. App. Oct. 27, 2006), available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/-
Civ/2006/1371.html. Lord Justice Jacobs also appears to read another recent EPO Board
of Appeals decision, Case T 0424/03 - 3.5.1, Microsoft Corp., (EPO Bd. App. Feb. 23,
2006), as not requiring an inventive step that is technical in character. See Aerotel, supra,
at 77 26, 113-14. I am not convinced that this is the result the Board intended in Micro-
soft, though the Board's discussion of inventive step and technical character perhaps
could be clearer. See Microsoft, supra, 5.2, 7. If Lord Justice Jacobs's interpretation is
correct, however, and if the EPO were to follow that interpretation in future cases, the
EPO standard arguably would differ from the current U.S. approach only in requiring
some relation to technological arts-and only a minimal relation at that. See infra note
174 and accompanying text.
166. See Case T 0258/03, Summary of Facts and Submissions III.
167. Id. T 3.3.
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acter." 168 In other words, the question was whether "the invention in-
volves some contribution to the art in a field not excluded from patentabil-
ity.''169 In Hitachi, however, the Board of Appeals reversed this earlier
case law, holding "any comparison with the prior art... to be inappropri-
ate for examining the presence of an invention"; 170 "a mix of technical and
non-technical features may be patentable."1 71 As far as subject matter is
concerned, all that matters "is the presence of technical character which
may be implied by the physical features of an entity or the nature of an
activity, or may be conferred to a non-technical activity by the use of
technical means."' 72 The only "activities falling within the notion of a
non-invention 'as such' would typically represent purely abstract concepts
devoid of any technical implications."' 
73
One might conclude that the Board was overthrowing point of novelty
in its entirety, opting for the USPTO's approach of finding patentable sub-
ject matter as long as the inventor does not claim a computer program per
se. That conclusion would be premature, as the Board then went on to
conclude that the auction method at issue was unpatentable because it did
not "represent a nonobvious technical solution to a technical problem."174
In other words, in assessing the "inventive step" requirement-the ana-
logue to the U.S. Patent Act's nonobviousness requirement-the examiner
should take "account of only those features which contribute to a technical
character." 175 Applying that standard to the auction method, the Board
noted first that the "overall aim of the claimed method" was to identify a
successful bidder, and therefore that the aim lacked a technical charac-
ter.176 The dispositive question would therefore be whether the inventive
steps themselves were technical in nature. The Board concluded, however,
that the technical steps of the invention, such as those involving data
transmission and storage, were not inventive, but rather standard in the
field. 177 The inventive steps, by contrast, involving "using the stored in-
formation to arrive at the successful bidder," concerned only prices and
thus lacked any technical character. The prominent inventive feature "is





173. Id.; see also id. 4.6 (suggesting that even the "act of writing using pen and
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fundamentally independent of the computer arrangement for performing
the auction" and "could just as well be used for conducting a Dutch auc-
tion without computer support." 178 In short:
The invention can therefore be regarded as a mere automation of
the non-technical activity of performing a Dutch auction in the
absence of bidders. Any ingeniousness required to develop the
rules for the hypothetical auction cannot be considered for inven-
tive step .... The technical part of the invention is thus essen-
tially limited to instructing the server computer to apply the giv-
en conditions and perform any necessary calculations. 179
The EPO's approach as evidenced in Hitachi, therefore, appears to be
one in which the patentable subject matter requirement provides few ob-
stacles to patentability, but which denies patent protection to subject mat-
ter which fails to demonstrate at least one "step" that is both inventive and
technical. In a sense, it merely moves the relevant point of novelty inquiry
from the patentable subject matter to the inventive step (obviousness)
stage of the analysis. If the inventive step is one that can be performed by
a human being, the invention fails the inventive step criterion. This ap-
proach clearly differs from the current U.S. approach, under which both
patentable subject matter and nonobviousness (the latter in accordance
with section 103 of the Patent Act) are considered with respect to the in-
vention "as a whole," and not with respect to individual "steps" or ele-
ments. 180 Incorporating this approach into U.S. law, however, might be
difficult in light of the aforementioned language of section 103.
The works of Alan Durham and Dan Burk suggest two other possible
point of novelty approaches. Durham ultimately recommends an approach
that resembles the EPO's discarded contribution approach, under which
178. Id. 5.4, 5.7.
179. Id. 5.7. The Board went on to state that, "if a step of a method has been de-
signed in such a way as to be particularly suitable for being performed on a computer, it
has arguably a technical character. Suggesting such a step might require technical consid-
erations." Id. 5.8. But the Board nevertheless concluded that the subject matter at issue
did not contain any feature "which does not correspond to what a human being would do
if performing the auction without computer support." Id.
180. See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000). This section states:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically
disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the dif-
ference between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior
art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious
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one inquires whether the point of novelty or inventive step pertains to the
technological arts, 1 which Durham conceives as including software en-
gineering. 182 This approach would exclude inventions that couple standard
programming techniques with non-technological steps, on the ground that
"[a] patent claim that, in substance, describes only a non-technological
advancement should be held beyond the scope of the 'useful arts,' even if
it makes general references to existing technology."' 8 3 Alternatively, if
Burk is correct that we should be concerned about software patents that
read on First Amendment-protected speech, perhaps an approach that re-
quires the point of novelty to comprise something other than the software
is preferable. 184 Suppose, for example, that a claim comprises five ele-
ments, A, B, C, D, and E, where A, B, C, and D are prior art and E, the
only point of novelty, necessarily reads on speech that is both functional
and expressive and therefore, arguably, entitled to some degree of First
Amendment protection. In such a case, a patent precludes others from en-
gaging in otherwise lawful activity (practicing A, B, C, and D), based
upon the content of the speech (E) that accompanies the activity. If Burk is
right that much software is like E, this result comes uncomfortably close
to a content-based restriction on speech. To be sure, a patent might not
preempt all uses of E, but it would preempt otherwise lawful conduct
when coupled with the performance of E. A point of novelty approach that
focused on the non-software steps would preclude a patent in such a case,
unless there was some other step F that distinguished the invention from
the prior art, in which case an injunction would not be based on the pres-
ence of E. In some instances this solution might be hard to square with the
Durham proposal, however. A fruitful ground for future scholarly inquiry
might center on the fundamental question of whether, or when, software
patents embody elements such as the hypothetical "E" that qualify as pro-
tected First Amendment speech. '
8 5
181. Cf Durham, supra note 94, at 1518-19 (arguing that the problem with some
inventions is that "the part that is new is not technological, and the part that is techno-
logical is not new," and that in such cases "[e]ither the black letter rules of patent law
must give a little, or we must resign ourselves to patents on some essentially non-
technological inventions").
182. See id. at 1522-25.
183. Id. at 1525.
184. Though possibly neither will accommodate the First Amendment interest suffi-
ciently. Perhaps patent law needs a fair use doctrine, as Burk suggests. See Burk, supra
note 133, at 150-54.
185. Burk himself is not sure that software should qualify as protected speech; he
notes only that, in some contexts, courts have held that it is. See id. at 102 ("1 believe the
long-term implications of holding software to be protected speech could be more trouble-
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Professor Collins has proposed a reformulated mental steps doctrine
that is structurally similar to the Durham and Burk proposals relating to
technological arts. Under Collins' proposed version of the mental steps
doctrine, an invention would be unpatentable if it met four criteria: (1) the
claim recited "at least one act of information processing that can be per-
formed by the human mind"; (2) the mental step is more than merely "a
necessary accessory to real-world human action"; (3) the step is not mere-
ly one that recites an act of observation, but rather processes information;
and (4) "the non-thought-based steps do not constitute a patentable method
(and therefore are not a useful, novel and nonobvious method) in and of
themselves."' 
86
Inversely, in a claim that does not propertize thought, any recited
thought-based steps are technically superfluous steps in an oth-
erwise valid claim that are added to make the utility of the claim
more intuitively self-evident . . . In these latter claims, the
thought-based steps are harmless to the public because they do
nothing more than restrict the scope of a patentee's rights to ex-
clude. 187
In addition to his proposal that is specific to the propertization of
thought, the claim at issue in Metabolite would be unpatentable, because
"the only recited non-thought based step in the claim," that is, the one in-
volving assaying homocysteine, was known to the prior art.' Collins ar-
gues that, because thought is often non-volitional, a claim that combines
prior art with possibly non-volitional thought "may prevent the public
from performing actions that, prior to the issuance of the patent, the public
had the right to perform."1 89 Moreover, this approach might serve to vin-
some than the immediate folly such a holding might rectify."). His paper was published
before the Supreme Court's decision in Eldred v. Ashcrofi, however, and it might be use-
ful to consider whether the Court's relative lack of concern over the effect of copyright
extension on protected speech would translate into an analogous lack of concern in the
patent realm--or not, given patent law's lack of equivalents to fair use or the
idea/expression dichotomy.
186. Kevin Emerson Collins, Propertizing Thought, Syllogistic and Other, at 16-18,
available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/ipsc/papers2/Collins.doc; see
also Collins, supra note 27, at 16-24.
187. Collins, supra note 186, at 18.
188. See id. at 19.
189. Id. at 27. Collins justifies his proposal in part on the ground that strict liability
for claims that "propertize" reflexive thought, using his terminology, unconstitutionally
removes subject matter from the public domain. See Collins, supra note 140, at 54-56. He
therefore suggests that, in Metabolite, a third step consisting of "delivering a diagnosis of
a B vitamin deficiency or a normal B vitamin level to the patient," might resolve the con-
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dicate personal autonomy interests by holding unpatentable inventions that
otherwise would render conduct infringing merely because of the perhaps
involuntary operation of the mind. 190 As the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals suggested in an earlier time and place, "It is self-evident that
thought is not patentable."' 91
stitutional overbreadth problem. See id. at 69-70. The addition of the third step, however,
would not cure the constitutional defects of the Metabolite claim if it is an interference
with self-ownership interests that underlies the objection to the propertization of thought.
See Collins, supra note 186, at 61-66.
190. Presumably the doctrine would not target so-called "ministerial" mental steps,
such as merely observing a phenomenon, but rather only information-processing steps.
See 1 CHISUM, supra note 17, § 1.03[6][a] (noting that courts applying the mental steps
distinguished between ministerial and evaluative mental steps); Collins, supra note 27
(manuscript at 16) (making a similar distinction).
191. In re Abrams, 188 F.2d 165, 168 (C.C.P.A. 1951). On balance, Collins' recom-
mended reform to address the problem created by the confluence of strict liability and the
reflexiveness of some acts of thinking would appear fairly modest in its effects. In terms
of the Metabolite case, for example, the claim at issue would constitute patentable subject
matter as long as some third element, such as "instructing the patient regarding the diag-
nosis of cobalamin deficiency" or "administering treatment for the deficiency" was added
to the first two. See supra note 189. But if it would be easy to add such a step in most
such cases, the reform makes no sweeping change to existing law. One might also note
that patent owners are not likely to haul people into court for merely thinking. Someone
who infringes the claim at issue in Metabolite by testing and then doing nothing more
than making a mental correlation is unlikely to be detected. And even if he were detected,
it is doubtful there would be any effective remedy for the infringement. What would be
the benefit of an injunction, and what lost profits or royalties could be attributed to a
merely mental correction? Hence there would be little incentive to sue. Looked at from
the other direction, however, the modesty of the reform may be one of its virtues. Requir-
ing the addition of a third step to claims such as the claim at issue in Metabolite would
appear to have little disincentive effect upon medical research, if indeed the third step is
easy to conceive and if few infringement claims would ever be premised upon purely
mental correlations without more. Moreover, the reform would have the modest benefit
of reducing the potential for unscrupulous or vindictive patent owners to use claims like
the one at issue in Metabolite as a tool for harassment, by making clear that no one is
even technically or theoretically liable for purely unavoidable behavior such as thinking.
In an analogous context, a question under debate today is whether a real property owner
is liable for infringement if a patented seed blows onto her property and begins propagat-
ing there, through no affirmative act whatsoever on the part of the real property owner.
Patent infringement is a strict liability regime, to be sure, but arguably even strict liability
usually contemplates some volitional act on the part of the alleged tortfeasor. If this latter
line of reasoning is correct, however, it would also suggest that no one should be liable
for the mere act of thinking, which is similarly often nonvolitional. See Collins, supra
note 140, at 36-39 (distinguishing purposive and reflexive acts of thinking). In other
words, I may have as little control over the memes that propagate within my brain as I do
over the seeds that propagate within my real property. Finally, even if it would be rare for
an infringement claim to be premised on the mere thinking of patentable thoughts, why
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In summary, if the technological arts and mental steps doctrines are to
have even a modest impact, they may require the reintroduction of some
sort of point of novelty test. Although the EPO's approach, which defers
the relevant inquiry until the inventive step stage, may have much to rec-
ommend it, it is likely to be difficult to incorporate such a standard into
U.S. law without amending section 103. By contrast, one could apply the
approaches of Durham, Burk, and Collins at the subject matter stage,
screening out inventions whose novelty and nonobviousness in relation to
the prior art either (1) pertain to a non-technological art or (2) depend
upon a step that can be performed mentally. Perhaps other commentators
might further improve upon these proposals. Further, in the case of the
Durham and Burk proposals, commentators would need to draw some
conclusion as to whether an element comprising software is more like
speech or engineering. All three proposals, however, might have the salu-
brious consequence of screening out patents that would otherwise intrude
upon laws of nature and human liberty interests, while still permitting pat-
ent law to adapt to and accommodate new technology. In this respect, the
proposals arguably preserve the wisdom of the older tradition without
making a fetish of that tradition for its own sake.
B. Physical Transformation Doctrine
Reforming the physical transformation rule might be somewhat easier
than reforming either the technological arts or mental steps rules. Judge
Barrett's suggestion in Lundgren actually points the way to a plausible
reconciliation of the autonomy principle with the principle that computer-
related art should not be arbitrarily excluded from the scope of patentable
subject matter, even if it transforms nothing more than electric signals rep-
resenting one form of data into signals representing another form of data.
Recall that, under Judge Barrett's proposal, a process is patentable as long
as it (1) is useful and (2) transforms matter or energy external to the hu-
man actor.192 This definition would recognize much computer-related art
as patent eligible, but it would exclude what appear to be the most trou-
bling patents from the standpoint of human liberty interests. Absent some
compelling need to come close to invading these interests, which has yet
to be demonstrated, a Burkean-inspired perspective on patent law might
counsel against expanding patent protection to such non-traditional subject
should the state even theoretically be able to penalize its citizens for the content of their
thoughts?
192. Exparte Lundgren, 76 U.S.P.Q.2D 1385, 1399 (B.P.A.I. 2005) (Barrett, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
[Vol. 22:855
A BURKEAN PERSPECTIVE ON PATENT ELIGIBILITY
matter, even if it remains agnostic or even supportive on the topic of the
patentability of much computer-related art.
V. CONCLUSION
An optimist might say that the rise of the "useful, concrete, and tangi-
ble result" criterion, coupled with the concomitant abolition of the techno-
logical arts, mental steps, and physical transformation doctrines, is all part
of the logical, orderly progression of patent law from some dim, archaic
past. No longer will patentable subject matter be bound to arbitrary limita-
tions. Any and all discoveries other than laws of nature, abstract ideas, and
naturally occurring physical phenomena can and should be patented. In
fact, let everything be patented, and the market will take care of the rest.
Anything less threatens to stem the rising tide of innovation and progress.
But this rosy scenario should give us pause. Patents are an integral part
of the U.S. economy, but there is no evidence that extending patent protec-
tion into every comer of human activity would bring positive returns. Fur-
ther, there is potentially much to lose. What will likely disappear in the
transition to an "anything goes" system are some of the less quantifiable,
but real, benefits of a patent system that is more humble in its aspirations.
These include potential losses to freedom of speech, personal autonomy,
and other liberty interests that are compromised when virtually any human
activity, including involuntary mental processes, can intrude upon some-
one else's patent rights. Some of the traditional doctrines of patent law
may have embodied latent liberty-preserving wisdom that we discard at
our peril.
Edmund Burke concluded his Reflections on the Revolution in France
by describing himself as someone who, "when the equipoise of the vessel
in which he sails may be endangered by overloading it upon one side, is
desirous of carrying the small weight of his reasons to that which may pre-
serve its equipoise."' 93 Contemporary patent law can be an enormous
force for good, but it too is arguably in danger of losing its equipoise. I
have argued herein that, in pursuit of a rational, orderly system under
which virtually anything constitutes patentable subject matter, patent law
has cast overboard traditional limiting doctrines that silently assisted in the
preservation of liberty and other human interests. Respect for the wisdom
of the past may not appear as satisfying as the imposition upon messy real-
ity of some rational, orderly, all-encompassing plan-whether symbolized
by words such as "Libertd, tgalit6, Fraternit6," or "Useful, Concrete, and
193. BuRKE, supra note 3, at 210.
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Tangible"-but restraint and moderation may be wiser in the longer run.
Naive as it may sound to our jaded modem ears, perhaps we would be bet-
ter off accepting some of those so-called "self-evident" truths' 94 as self-
evident after all. Vive /'ancien r~gime.
194. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
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